Nordic organizations are increasing IT resilience investments, but the real challenge is proving critical services can continue and recover when disruption occurs.
For leaders, this shifts the question from “Do we have resilience plans?” to “Do we have evidence that our critical services will continue and recover?”
Evidence starts with the complete business service: its technology, data, people and suppliers. Readiness means testing whether these dependencies can work together within agreed recovery requirements, with clear decision-making when disruption hits.
Backups, redundancy, cybersecurity and disaster recovery remain essential. But restoring an application without identity, integrations, usable data, infrastructure, people or an available supplier may still leave the business unable to operate. A technical recovery is not necessarily a service recovery. Start with the business service, then work backwards through the dependencies required to deliver it.
The research reflects this broader perspective: 40% define resilience as a combination of continuity, recovery and risk management, while 33% emphasize continuous operations. Only 4% primarily associate it with incident recovery. Resilience therefore needs to connect technology choices with business impact and agreed recovery requirements.
The survey assessed five readiness indicators, with results ranging from 44% to 58%. Together, they distinguish having recovery arrangements from demonstrating that those arrangements work.
Ask five questions:
Then ask the harder question: what evidence sits behind each “yes”?
Readiness is a spectrum, not a yes-or-no condition. The key question is which missing capability could prevent a critical service from continuing or recovering. Business impact analysis establishes what interruption means. RTO defines the required recovery time; RPO defines the acceptable data-loss window. Test the full service against those requirements. A gap found in an exercise is a priority you can act on, not an assumption carried into the next incident.
Workforce readiness and crisis management structures were joint highest among capabilities considered critical for maintaining operations, each selected by 52%. Monitoring and detection followed at 44%, and automated failover at 36%. Yet 40% place primary resilience ownership below executive level in IT, and 11% have no clear owner. The issue is not the owner’s position alone. It is whether the owner has sufficient mandate, clear escalation routes and the ability to coordinate cross-business decisions under pressure.
The practical question is whether recovery decisions have been made clear before disruption. Who prioritizes services when capacity is constrained? Who authorizes recovery actions? Who coordinates critical suppliers? Who communicates with the business?
Named owners, deputies, escalation routes and rehearsed playbooks turn technical recovery capability into an executable response.
Third-party dependence is identified as one of the main IT resilience barriers by 27% of respondents. Yet joint testing is far from routine. 68% test their ability to maintain or recover critical services internally at least annually. Only 22% regularly test continuity jointly with critical suppliers.
A supplier’s continuity plan provides assurance only up to a point. Joint testing can reveal whether escalation routes, recovery assumptions and fallback arrangements work together. The question is not whether each provider has a plan, but whether their combined response supports the business service.
Share of organizations by number of yes answers across the five readiness checks described above (%).

Number of readiness checks passed (of 5)
At Vivicta, we approach IT resilience as a repeatable cycle: Assess. Improve. Validate.
Assess: establish the business impact, recovery requirements and dependencies of a critical service. Identify where current capability and evidence fall short.
Improve: address the gaps most likely to prevent the service from continuing or recovering within its agreed requirements.
Validate: test the complete service end-to-end. Capture what worked, what failed and what needs to change before testing again.
The goal is not another continuity document. Testing creates evidence; evidence identifies gaps; and those gaps provide a clearer basis for the next resilience investment.
That requires looking beyond individual technologies and controls. A critical service depends on a wider system of applications, infrastructure, data, identity, people and suppliers. If one of those dependencies cannot recover within the required timeframe, the service may still fail. This is why IT resilience needs to move from assumptions to evidence.

Start with one critical business service
Building resilience across an entire organization can quickly become complex. A practical starting point is one critical business service.
Define what the service must deliver during disruption and how quickly it must recover. Map the technology, data, identity, people and suppliers it depends on. Set the required RTO and RPO. Clarify decision authority. Then test whether those dependencies can recover together within the agreed requirements.
The evidence from that exercise shows where readiness is proven, where assumptions remain untested and where the next resilience investment can have the greatest impact.
The real measure of IT resilience is not how prepared you believe you are. It is what you can demonstrate.
Explore Vivicta’s State of IT Resilience in the Nordics for the broader Nordic picture. Then bring the question back to your own organization: which critical business service can you prove is ready to recover?
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